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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Order that is the subject of this appeal is a final order 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). Pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this appeal was transferred to the Court of 
Appeals for disposition by order of the Utah Supreme Court dated 
June 25, 1990. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issues For Review and Standard of Review. 
(a) Did the district court err in awarding compound 
interest? The availability of interest is a question of law; the 
reviewing court gives no deference to the district court's views 
of legal questions, reviewing the decision instead for correctness. 
See, Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
(b) Did the district court err in entering an Order 
granting relief exceeding the nature and issues raised by the 
pleadings and not granted at the hearing? Since this issue 
involves only a legal principle and review of written material, the 
district court's decision is subject to no deference. See, Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d at 1385. 
1 
(c) Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' 
fees not compensable under the parties' contract? The interpreta-
tion of a contract's provisions is a question of law; in reviewing 
questions of law the district court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed de novo. See, 50 West Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency 
of Salt Lake, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989); In re Infant 
Anonymous 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988). Cf. Carr v. Enoch 
Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah App. 1989). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
After a bench trial, the district court entered a money 
judgment against Appellants ("White Pine") and in favor of 
Appellees (the "Sharps"). That September 28, 1988 Judgment (the 
"Judgment") was the subject of an earlier appeal by White Pine in 
this Court's Case No. 880710-CA.1 All issues involved in this 
appeal involve post-judgment actions taken by the district court 
during the pendency of that appeal. During White Pine's appeal of 
the judgment it posted a supersedeas bond and obtained a stay of 
execution (the "Stay"). This Stay continued unchallenged for a 
1
 This Court's disposition of that case is now the subject of 
a pending Petition for Writ of Certiorari before the Utah Supreme 
Court, Petition No. 900360. 
2 
year, when the Sharps moved the district court to supplement the 
Judgment and to increase the amount of the bond. 
The parties briefed the issues and thereafter argued their 
positions at a hearing. At the hearing, the district court granted 
the Sharps relief "as prayed". Thereafter, the Sharps presented 
an order that was legally incorrect in two respects: (1) it 
provided for compound interest; (2) it vacated the previously 
imposed Stay, an issue that was not raised by the pleadings, not 
raised by the parties, and not ruled on by the district court. 
Even though White Pine filed specific objections to that order, the 
district court executed it as submitted. 
Because of an obvious legal error in that initial order (it 
included future interest) the Sharps submitted an amended order 
that did not provide for future interest, but was otherwise 
unchanged. White Pine again objected, and the district court again 
executed the order as submitted. White Pine appeals from those 
parts of the amended order providing for compound interest and 
vacating the Stay. 
In addition, White Pine appeals from the district court's 
award of attorneys' fees to the Sharps on the ground that award is 
contrary to the parties' agreement, premature, and beyond the 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
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B. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On December 16, 1988, after the Judgment was entered, White 
Pine moved the district court for a stay of the Judgment pending 
appeal and for approval of a supersedeas bond in the amount of 
$65,158.77, which included the shortfall calculated in the 
Judgment, along with interest through June 30, 1989. (R. 1509). 
The Sharps opposed that motion, arguing the supersedeas bond should 
be $310,287.31. (R. 1561). Thereafter, the district court set the 
amount of the bond at $79,793.36, and on January 20, 1989 White 
Pine posted a supersedeas bond in that increased amount. 
(R. 1742). Once again, on January 23, 1989, the Sharps objected, 
arguing that White Pine "should be required to obtain a reputable 
surety with a solid background upon which the Sharps may rely for 
security against losses resulting from an unsuccessful t 
appeal . . . " (R. 1700). 
Finally, based upon the stipulation of White Pine and the 
Sharps, the district court entered its Order Re: Supersedeas Bond 
on March 17, 1989 (the "Stay"). (R. 1725). That Order established 
two critical matters: (1) the form of security for the bond 
(Lot 1, White Pine Ranches Subdivision Phase I, as recorded in the 
offices of the Summit County Recorder) was determined to be good 
and sufficient; and (2) Lot 1 would be considered for security for 
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increases, if any, in the supersedeas bond amount at a hearing to 
be held after November 19, 1989. (R. 1726). 
On November 3, 1989, in accordance with para. 3 of that March 
17, 1989 Order, the Sharps filed their Request for Hearing on (1) 
a previously filed Motion to Supplement Judgment; (2) their request 
for additional attorneys' fees; and (3) their request for an 
increase in the supersedeas bond amount. (R. 1765). On December 
11, 1989, the Sharps filed their Second Motion to Supplement 
Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on Bond, in which the 
Sharps again requested, inter alia, the district court to increase 
the amount of the supersedeas bond. (R. 1774). At no time did the 
Sharps request the district court to order White Pine to post 
additional, or different, security. 
The district court heard that Motion on February 12, 1990. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on that Motion, the district court 
granted the Sharps' Motion "as prayed". (R. 2059, 2135). 
When the Sharps presented their proposed Order on the Sharps' 
Second Motion to White Pine's counsel, however, the Order said 
nothing about increasing the amount of the supersedeas bond; 
instead it required White Pine "to post additional security" in 
the amount of $136,800.99 on or before March 15, 1990. (R. 2073; 
Add. 11). That Order (the "Initial Order") was entered on March 
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16, 1990, the same day White Pine served its objections to the 
Order- (R. 2078). 
It is important to note that the Initial Order vacated the 
district court's year-old Order Staying Proceedings if such 
additional security was not posted by March 15, 1990. In other 
words, the prior Stay was effectively vacated before the order 
vacating it was enteared. The Initial Order was entered even though 
the Sharps never requested that the Stay be vacated, and the issue 
was neither raised nor ruled on at the February 12, 1990 hearing. 
(R. 2110-2137). In other words, White Pine never knew there was 
any possibility the Stay would be vacated until after the district 
court signed the erroneous Initial Order. 
On March 16, 1990, White Pine also served its Motions for 
Continuance of Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal 
and Approval of Supersedeas Bond. (R. 2078). As set forth in that 
Motion, the surety had theretofore filed a financial statement with 
the district court indicating that the net worth of the surety in 
March 1989 totaled $220,000.00, more than (1) the sum of the 
initial Judgment and (2) the increase ordered by the district 
court. (R. 2082). Accordingly, White Pine requested the district 
court to enter an Order (1) staying enforcement of the judgment 
pending final determination by this Court; and (2) declaring that 
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the existing security be considered adequate, and in full 
compliance with the Judgment and stay. (R. 2083). 
On April 16, 1990, White Pine filed its Motion for Relief from 
Judgment on the grounds that the Initial Order exceeded the relief 
requested by the Sharps, and accordingly was void. (R. 2098). The 
Initial Order provided for future interest through August 1, 1990, 
and in its supporting memorandum, White Pine pointed out that it 
was erroneous for the Initial Order to award future interest. 
(R. 2106). In the meantime, on April 30, 1990, the Sharps served 
their proposed Amended Order omitting the award of future interest. 
(R. 2203; Add. 22). On May 7, 1990 the district court announced 
it would execute the Amended Order upon its presentation, and 
otherwise denied White Pine's Motion. (R. 2168). 
On May 1, 1990, six weeks after the Initial Order had been 
entered, the Sharps filed their memorandum in opposition to White 
Pine's motion for a continuance of the Stay and, for the first 
time, objected to the sufficiency of the existing security. 
(R. 2159). On May 8, 1990, White Pine filed its reply, (1) point-
ing out that the Sharps never objected to the sufficiency of the 
security until April 30, 1990, and (2) requesting an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether the real property presently securing 
the bond was sufficient pending appeal. (R. 2170-2173). 
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White Pine further demonstrated in its reply that the Sharps 
were merely re-litigating arguments they had already made in their 
January 1989 objection to the initial bond. As pointed out in 
White Pine's reply, "the form and nature of the security has been 
approved by the Court, and its acceptability is now the law of the 
case. The only issue remaining is whether the security is suffi-
cient to guarantee the payment of unsecured fees, costs and 
interest, which the Court has found to be $216,594.34 as of 
August 1, 1990." (R. 2172-2173). 
On May 11, 1990, White Pine filed its present appeal of the 
Initial Order (R. 2194) pursuant to an order extending White Pine's 
Time for Appeal (R. 2095). Three days later, on May 14, 1990, the 
district court entered the Amended Order re: Defendants' Second 
Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on 
Bond (the "Amended Order") (R. 2197; Add. 16). 
The Amended Order corrected the future interest problem 
contained in the Initial Order, but it did not correct the remain-
ing deficiencies. Accordingly, White Pine objected to the Amended 
Order before it was entered (R. 2175) and, thereafter, on May 24, 
1990 filed its Amended Notice of Appeal for the purpose of 
appealing the Amended Order (R. 2217). 
The Amended Order states, at paragraph 2: 
The Judgment entered in this matter on 
September 26, 1988 is hereby supplemented 
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through February 12, 1990, by the amount of 
$231,636.97 for a total judgment of 
$938,053.02 as of February 12, 1990. 
(R. 2198; Add. 9) (emphasis added). This provision results in the 
impermissible compounding of interest. 
The Amended Order also granted the Sharps their attorneys' 
fees through October 31, 1989, even though the Sharps had not yet 
prevailed in any appeal — a condition precedent of the Judgment 
for an award of any additional attorneys' fees. In that regard, 
the Judgment provided, in pertinent part: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that this Judgment shall be supplemented and 
augmented in the amount of the Sharps' 
reasonable attorney's fees as established by 
affidavit and as incurred after August 31, 
1988, in preparation of the Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any 
post-trial motions, in collecting said 
Judgment by execution or otherwise, and after 
prevailing in any appeal. 
(R. 2183; Add. 4) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, under the Amended Order the Stay of Execution 
Pending Appeal was lifted as of March 15, 1990, two months before 
the Amended Order was entered on May 14, 1990. (R. 2198; Add. 17). 
The Initial Order, which was entered March 16, 1990, contained the 
same language: 
Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as a 
supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution 
of the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas 
Bond dated March 17, 1989 in the amount of $136,800.99 
on or before March 15, 1990. If Plaintiffs fail to do 
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so by March 15, 1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated 
January 31, 1989 shall be automatically vacated and the 
Sharps shall be allowed to proceed to execute on the 
Judgment entered in the above captioned matter. 
(R.2073-74, 2202; Add. 11-12; 21). 
Both orders, therefore, required White Pine to post increased 
security before either order was entered, thereby precluding any 
opportunity for White Pine to comply with the orders and avoid a 
lifting of the stay., The district court was never requested to 
order a lifting of the stay, and that matter was never addressed 
at the February 12, 1990 hearing on the Sharps' motion (R. 2110-
2137) . 
At the time the Amended Order was entered on May 14, 1990, 
White Pine's Motions for Continuance of Order Staying Enforcement 
of Judgment Pending Appeal and Approval of Supersedeas Bond 
(R. 2082) had been pending before the district court for almost two 
months. Even though White Pine was entitled to a stay of execution 
on the money Judgment as a matter of right,2 and had requested a 
hearing on the Stay and the adequacy of the security for the 
previously filed supersedeas bond (R. 2173), the district court 
declined to hold such a hearing or to permit White Pine to argue 
its entitlement to the Stay. Instead, the district court simply 
2
 See Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah App. 
1987) and discussion at Point VI, B, infra. 
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entered the Amended Order lifting the Stay, without giving White 
Pine any opportunity either to demonstrate that the existing 
security was adequate or to post some other adequate security• 
As a result of all these actions by the district court, White 
Pine claims it committed three errors: (1) the district court 
erred in ordering compound interest; (2) the district court erred 
in entering an order lifting the stay even though that relief was 
never requested, never argued, and never ruled upon at the hearing; 
and (3) the district court erred in awarding additional attorneys' 
fees. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The orders prepared by the Sharps' counsel and entered by the 
district court erroneously allow compound interest. 
The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
revoke or lift the Stay once the Stay had been approved; even if 
the district court had that power, it could not award relief that 
had not been requested in the Sharps' pleadings, had not been 
briefed or argued by the parties, and had not been granted in the 
district court's oral ruling. 
Finally, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
to supplement the Sharps' attorneys' fees once White Pine had 
appealed the Judgment. Even if the district court had such 
11 
authority, it failed to make the findings of fact required in 
connection with an award of attorneys' fees. 
All of these legal errors by the district court make the 
orders entered by the district court void. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the orders appealed from. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE AMENDED ORDER IMPERMISSIBLY COMPOUNDS INTEREST. 
Compound interest is "interest on interest, in that accrued 
interest is added periodically to the principal, and interest is 
computed upon the new principal thus formed; . . . " Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah App. 
1989) (quoting, 45 Am.Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 76 (1969)). 
Due to the general judicial disfavor of interest on interest, 
compound interest is not permitted unless the parties contract 
otherwise, or unless the statute providing for interest on 
judgments expressly requires compounding.3 See, e.g., Watkins & 
Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979); Estate Landscape 
& Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 793 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah App. 1990); Neale, 783 P.2d at 555. 
In this case, the original September 26, 1988 Judgment 
separately listed various amounts owing by categories, along with 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 does not permit compound 
interest. See, Estate Landscape, 793 P.2d at 420. 
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interest rates thereon or per diems for each separate amount. 
Nowhere in that Judgment is there a total judgment amount. 
(R. 2182; Add. 3). 
The Amended Order, however, purports to "supplement" the 
original Judgment by the total amount of $231,636.97, $151,670.63 
of which represents interest. (R. 2199-2200; Add. 18-19). Unlike 
the Judgment, however, the Amended Order included a "total Judgment 
of $938,053.02." (R. 2198; Add. 17). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, this total Judgment 
amount of $938,053.02 — including the $151,670.63 of interest 
included therein — bears interest from and after February 12, 1990 
at the annual rate of 12%. Thus, every year White Pine will be 
required to pay $18,200.36 of compounded interest on the 
$151,670.63 of interest that the Amended Order added to the 
original Judgment. Under the Neale definition of "compound 
interest", the Amended Order unquestionably creates a situation 
where interest is impermissibly compounded. 
On May 8, 1990, a week before the Amended Order was entered, 
White Pine filed an objection to the Amended Order which read, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
The Amended Order purports to create a 
judgment as of February 12, 1990 in the total 
amount of $938,053.02. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-1-4. This total sum, including 
interest, would bear interest at 12%. This 
13 
constitutes an impermissible compounding of 
interest. 
(R. 2177). White Pine even went so far as to submit to the 
district court a proposed Supplemented Judgment which avoided the 
compounding problem. (R. 2187-2190). 
The district court nevertheless entered the Amended Order 
which has been designated in the court records as a Judgment (R. 
2197; Add. 16). By their drafting, the Sharps have created a 
Judgment which gives them $18,200.36 per year of compound interest 
to which they are not entitled. That award is contrary to law and 
should be reversed. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIFTING THE PREVIOUSLY 
IMPOSED STAY 
As with the compounding of interest, the Sharps inserted in 
the Amended Order a provision lifting the Stay which is legally 
improper. The first time White Pine had any idea the Sharps were 
seeking to have the Stay lifted was when White Pine's counsel 
received the Sharps' proposed Initial Order. Once again, White 
Pine objected explicitly to the inclusion of this provision (R. 
2177-78), but the district court nevertheless executed the Sharps' 
order. During the pendency of its appeal of this money Judgment, 
White Pine was entitled to the stay as a matter of right upon the 
posting of adequate security. See, Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 
1026, 1027 (Utah App. 1987). The district court accordingly erred 
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as a matter of law in lifting the Stay in the absence of any 
request that it do so and in denying White Pine a hearing on the 
issues surrounding the issuance of a supersedeas bond. Moreover, 
once the Stay was granted, the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to revoke it. 
1. The Sharps' Pleadings Did Not Request That The Stay Be Lifted. 
In their November 3, 1989 Request for Hearing, the Sharps 
requested only an increase in the amount of the supersedeas bond. 
Similarly, the Sharps' December 11, 1989 Second Motion requested 
only that the amount of the bond be increased. Indeed, after White 
Pine filed its objections to the Sharps' Second Motion, the Sharps 
replied: "It is not unreasonable to require [White Pine] to 
increase the amount of their supersedeas bond." (R. 2042). 
(emphasis added). 
The Sharps made reference to increasing the amount of the bond 
three different times. They never, however, requested (1) any 
different security, or (2) that the Stay be lifted. In fact, at 
the hearing on the Sharps' Second Motion, their counsel framed this 
issue in terms of only "why the bond should not be increased." 
(R. 2113). All the argument at the February 12, 1990 hearing on 
the Sharps' Second Motion focused on the increased amount, if any, 
of the supersedeas bond. 
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When the Sharps' counsel submitted the Initial Order, however, 
it contained two provisions that were devastating to White Pine, 
and which had been totally unaddressed by the Sharps' pleadings: 
(1) White Pine was ordered to post additional security in the 
amount of $136,800.90; and (2) the Stay was automatically lifted 
if White Pine had not filed the additional bond by March 15, 1990, 
two days before the Initial Order was even entered. Because the 
posting of additional security and the lifting of the Stay had 
never been requested, argued, or ruled on, White Pine was unfairly 
and unjustifiably surprised by the inclusion of these provisions 
in the Initial Order. 
This Court has ruled such an order is void as a matter of law. 
See, Hendricks v. Interstate Homes, Inc., 745 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 
App. 1989). The rule announced in Hendricks reflects a 
longstanding recognition that Utcih courts have no subject matter 
jurisdiction to grant relief not sought by the pleadings. 
In Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Bragg, 67 Utah 60, 245 P. 966 
(1925), the Bank sought to enforce two mortgages which had been 
executed on behalf of minors by their guardian. The guardian 
executed those mortgages only after receiving district court 
authorization, and the district court thereafter ordered 
foreclosure. In the minors' appeal of the foreclosure decree the 
bank argued that no pleading, petition, affidavit or other 
16 
triggering device was necessary to invoke the court's jurisdiction. 
Id. at 973. In reversing the foreclosure decree, the Court wrote: 
It is fundamental that a petition or pleading of some 
kind is the juridical means of investing a court with 
jurisdiction of subject-matter to adjudicate it, and a 
judgment which is beyond or not supported by pleadings 
must fall. . . . A fact apparent from the mandatory 
record, showing that fundamental law was disregarded in 
the establishment of the judgment, will render it null 
and void for all purposes. 
Id. 
In Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926), the Court 
addressed the extent to which a California custody decree was 
entitled to full faith and credit. In its discussion of that 
issue, the Court recognized that 
there is no principle better established than what is 
not juridically presented cannot be juridically decided. 
Just as elemental is it that pleadings are the juridical 
means of investing a court with jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter to adjudicate it and that a judgment or 
decree beyond or not within them is a nullity, for the 
court is bound by its record. These are immutable 
elements. 
Id. at 104. See also, Vovles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913, 
914 (1930) ("it would be improper in any case to award a judgment 
for what is not demanded.") 
All these authorities compel the conclusion that the district 
court's lifting of the Stay was erroneous. White Pine had no 
notice whatsoever that the Sharps were seeking to have the Stay 
lifted. All of the Sharps' pleadings requested only that the 
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amount of the bond be increased. White Pine had no opportunity to 
present any evidence regarding the propriety of the lifting of that 
Stay or the adequacy of the existing bond. Instead, White Pine was 
unfairly, and without warning, devastated by an order lifting the 
Stay two days before the Order lifting it was even entered. Due 
process and controlling authority require more than this. Parties 
and their counsel cannot be permitted to put any result they desire 
in a proposed order in the hope that the order will be signed, as 
happened here. The lifting of the Stay was reversible error. 
In Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court considered the appropriate standards to be applied in 
granting stays pending appeal. In the case of money judgments such 
as the one the district court granted the Sharps, an appellant is 
entitled to a stay as a matter of right upon the posting of a 
supersedeas bond. See, id. at 1027. In this case White Pine had 
posted that bond a year earlier and was expecting only to increase 
the amount of that bond. It was never given that opportunity, 
however, because the Initial Order required it to post additional 
security two days before the Order requiring it to do so was even 
entered. By inserting this unprayed-for, unbriefed and unawarded 
provision into the Initial Order, the Sharps and the district court 
divested White Pine of the Stay it was entitled to as a matter of 
right. 
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2. The District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Lift 
Or Revoke The Stay, 
Moreover, Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d) permits a district court only 
to approve a supersedeas bond. It is silent regarding the district 
court's power to revoke a stay once it becomes effective. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, interpret-
ing the functionally identical federal rule, addressed this issue 
in In re Fed. Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 
1955). In that case the court directly confronted the issue 
whether a district court has "a continuing power to revoke a stay 
previously granted". Id. at 654. In specifically holding district 
courts have no such power to revoke stays, the court wrote: 
When the supersedeas becomes effective, the appellant 
obtains thereby a valuable right to have the status quo 
preserved until his appeal is heard and decided. Indeed, 
this right may be more valuable to him than the right of 
appeal, since we can conceive of a situation in which 
execution of the judgment while an appeal is pending 
might render the appeal moot. The provisions of the 
cited rules seem clearly to contemplate that the trial 
court's reserved power is exhausted when the court 
approves a supersedeas bond and the stay becomes 
effective. A different interpretation would have the 
effect of leaving a litigant's rights in a supersedeas 
ever subject to the jurisdiction of the trial judge until 
the appeal is finally decided. 
We conclude, therefore, that District Court had no 
jurisdiction to vacate the stay order previously entered 
or to take any action, for, on perfection of the appeal 
and entry of the order for supersedeas, jurisdiction over 
the supersedeas as well as of the judgment was 
transferred to this court. 
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It follows that the order purporting to vacate the stay-
in a cause already on appeal was void ab initio, and that 
the stay continued in effect• 
Id. at 655-56. 
Because the Initial Order and the Amended Order lifted the 
stay, a result not raised or even suggested in the Sharps' 
pleadings, and because the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to revoke the Stay, this Court should reverse the 
district court's revocation and lifting of the Stay. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ADDITIONAL 
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO THE SHARPS. 
As demonstrated in the preceding section of this brief, the 
district court granted a Stay which was irrevocable during the 
pendency of White Pine's appeal. The district court's January 31, 
1989 Order Staying Proceedings itself reflects the permanency of 
the Stay: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants, their agents or 
attorneys, are stayed and enjoined from undertaking any 
actions to execute, sell or notice for sale the property 
which is the subject of this action or take any other 
action to execute or enforce their rights under the 
judgment and that such stay shall remain in effect 
pending resolution of plaintiffs' appeal, which is 
currently pending in the Utah Court of Appeals, Appellate 
No. 880710-CA. 
(R. 1704). 
That Stay order continued: "However, defendants may schedule 
another hearing on or after November 12, 1989 to review the bond 
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amount," (R. 1704). This sentence grew out of a provision in the 
Judgment which provides: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the 
amount of the Sharps reasonable attorney's fees as 
established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31/ 
1988 in preparation of the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment, in responding to any post-trial motions, in 
collecting said Judgment by execution or otherwise, and 
after prevailing in any appeal. 
(R. 2183; Add. 4). 
The Judgment, therefore, circumscribed the Sharps' entitlement 
to additional attorneys' fees. The Sharps could only recover their 
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in connection with three 
specified activities, and only after prevailing in any appeal. By 
its terms, the Sharps were entitled to attorneys' fees in these 
three limited areas only after the appellate process had been 
concluded in their favor. Any contrary reading creates an absurd 
result. If the Sharps do not prevail on appeal, and if the 
district court's Judgment is ultimately reversed, the Sharps will 
not be entitled to attorneys fees, and any interim award will 
become a meaningless gesture. Furthermore, as demonstrated below, 
the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to order 
such supplementation during the appellate process. 
White Pine expressed all these concerns in its December 27, 
1989 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion to 
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Supplemental Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on Bond. 
(R. 1886-92). It specifically pointed out that in the event of an 
award of interim fees, "new appealcible issues may be created, which 
may require the filing of a second notice of appeal. In the 
interest of judicial economy and because of the Court's order 
staying these proceedings until after [White Pine's] appeal is 
concluded, [the Sharps'] motion to supplement judgment should be 
denied." (R. 1888). White Pine also pointed out that the November 
19, 1989 date was selected in the belief that the appeal would be 
concluded by that time (R. 1887). 
1. The District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To 
Supplement The Judgment, Or To Award Additional Attorneys' 
Fees. 
The foregoing events make clear that all concerned 
contemplated any supplementation of the Judgment would occur only 
if and after the Sharps prevailed on appeal. This is not only the 
plain language of the Judgment; it is the result dictated by law. 
It has long been established in Utah that a district court is 
divested of subject matter jurisdiction over a case while it is 
under advisement on appeal. See, White v. State of Utah, 137 
U.A.R. 3, 3-4 (Utah 1990). This rule is in accord with other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Parks v. Atlanta Pub. School Sys. Bd. 
of Educ. , 168 Ga. App. 572, 309 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1983) (trial court 
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judges have no jurisdiction to modify or supplement a judgment in 
any way once a notice of appeal has been filed). 
In this case, the district court ignored this fundamental 
principle of law, expressed in its own Judgment. Any purported 
supplementation is void because the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to amend, modify or supplement the Judgment 
while it was on appeal. This result is not only compelled by the 
law; it also makes sense. 
As pointed out in White Pine's objection to the requested 
supplementation, the award of additional attorneys' fees while the 
Judgment was on appeal would inevitably lead to a second appeal. 
That is exactly what occurred in this instance. Presumably, the 
Sharps presently feel free to go back again to the district court 
to obtain additional supplementation. Such an award would 
inevitably lead to yet a third appeal. Under the process followed 
by the Sharps and the district court there could be several interim 
awards, followed by several appeals. If the Utah Supreme Court 
grants White Pine's petition for certiorari and ultimately reverses 
the underlying Judgment, however, all such interim activity will 
become meaningless. This is an inefficient, wasteful, and absurd 
process. 
Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
to supplement the Judgment, this Court should rule that the Initial 
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Order and Amended Order are void and of no force • In that regard, 
it should direct the district court to take no further steps to 
amend, modify or supplement the Judgment until White Pine's appeal 
of that Judgment is concluded• 
2. The Attorneys' Fees Awarded By The District Court Were Legally 
Improper. 
The Judgment specifically awarded the Sharps additional 
attorneys' fees in three areas only: (1) preparing Findings, 
Conclusions, and the Judgment itself; (2) responding to post-trial 
motions; and (3) collecting on the judgment by execution or 
otherwise. (R. 2183; Add. 4). The Sharps did not appeal these 
limitations on their recovery, and they are now bound by them. 
The documents submitted by the Sharps in connection with their 
request for additional attorneys fees are an undecipherable 
compilation of activities that in no way assign activities to those 
categories (R. 1514-58; 1791-1880). Although the Sharps claimed 
an entitlement to an additional $104,906.23 in attorneys fees, (R. 
1515; 1792), the vast majority of enumerated activities bear no 
apparent relevance to the areas where the Judgment authorized 
supplementation. 
The most obvious example of the Sharps' attempts to go beyond 
the express terms of the Judgment is their effort to receive 
payment of attorneys' fees for time spent obtaining consents to 
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judgments fror i?; 
'*. 1980-82; 
1987; 2006; 2008- judicial ^ ^ ~ h ^ \ ^ action a c 
lienholders, who?> •. ^  , ;nrpriosare( ire 
necessary parties . . *,-• actic * < *de ;;i;i £s — 3" - ' See 
also, Dumont Corp. v. Arrinqton 71 Uucm 
I 11 Sharps ; ^ , . ow a daw* s _ u n~ or 
lienholders in their counterclaim. Siruie * he viitry " f Judgment vhe 
Sharps attempted to correct their e ts to 
Judgment, l'tum IMP h "junior lienholders; LOI cries* lun.or . lenholders 
refusing to give their consent, the Sharps then commenced <~ t'":.ally 
separate action w i f hou I n< it i c,:i.» I 11 Wh i t.i' I1" i ne, (T To 
compel White Pine to pay for such attorneys' fees . unreasonable 
a nd contrary to the express terms of the parties' contract m i hi' 
Judgment. 
Other examples rr i h* Sharps' request : r f^ ->^  -*-* \* • ;ie 
express terms Judgment m c i u no 
hit.- • I t. _ jnspl regarc , prospective ruyers ^* 
1908) 2) preparing for and attending conferences ^^garninn r tie 
development • w>~ite rine D " x *-
n<=> conversations A - t^rt byje ai^.^r 
"interested" buyer ..: White Pine Ranches ' *4~ lesuxv 
and negotiating , *< Sharps ? 
May 24, 1956, in favor of James H. Newton and Bertha N. Newton 
(R. 1951-53; 1959); and (5) responding to J, Richard Rees' 
bankruptcy (R. 1901-04; 1908-12; 1915; 1951; 1963; 1987-88; 1997); 
(6) inspecting Park City Property (R. 1980); and (7) preparing 
motions on the Sharps' behalf (R. 2008). 
Contrary to the district court's interim awards, the Judgment 
did not entitle the Sharps to recover attorneys' fees for every 
single act taken by their counsel. Due to the lack of any 
specificity, neither White Pine nor this Court could reasonably 
determine which of the Sharps' attorneys' fees are related to (1) 
preparing the findings, conclusions and judgment; (2) responding 
to post-trial motions; or (3) collecting the Judgment by execution 
or otherwise. 
In this regard, the district court did discillow some of the 
more blatant examples of unauthorized fees totalling approximately 
$25,000.00. (R. 2071-72; 2135; 2198-99; Add. 10, 18-19). This 
unsubstantiated, broad-brush approach is insuffxcient. The Utah 
Supreme Court has written that "on a number of occasions, we have 
held that attorney fees should be awarded on the basis of evidence 
and that findings of fact should be made which support the award." 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). 
This Court has reversed attorneys' fees awards when the 
district court failed to make the necessary findings and 
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conclusions. S e e , e.-.g...., Matter of Estate of Grimm, J0 • "D } ' ' ?38, 
riienciM1 i. in t. he record before us of findings and 
conclusions the Issue of attorneys' fees compels remand to the 
district court to correc - . . 
is rasp, perhaps because of the hopeless - riierminu; ~ng 
• >f activities , r-e ; ... ;;•; records of the Sharps' cuunse "^ 
district c*. conclusions whatii«.t= . er 
concerning t.^,-.- tittorneys' fees that were properly awarded pursuant 
\r three categories authorized by ci: >.*. 
-sue, White P5ne ^gorous., dispuceo "he 
reasonabilit; in-.: appropriateness of t:.e Sharps' -.: * • r for -itt r^ -'iey 
fees 1388-92 ; 2 iio-± ; ) li ?1 lite Pi i le ev ei :i r equested 
hearina r^» : ... attorneys' fee issue (R 2132), 
Disregarding a] j i:,.$. the district court awarded the Sharps nearly 
-•'"•/Ouu.uu in a n y no findings whatsoever. 
Findings are still required where, </ .e. -, rr^ records presented 
^re confused r difficult * ^  segregate. 
• " =J award of attorneys' fees 
should JXOC ^ reversed because \iv~ pleadings submitted by * ne 
Sharps do no: relate •«- *r rc^s xn wmuii c" *- * *-ys' 
f e P s i . * d l s t r i c t v. -. u *. i ^  a •-;! - G 
findings indicating the requested attorneys' fees 
were necessary, reasonabl I. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This appeal has resulted from the failure of the Sharps to 
recognize or honor even the most elemental limitations on their 
ability to obtain relief. Ignoring the long-standing and universal 
rule prohibiting the compounding of interest, they submitted an 
order awarding $18,000 per year in compound interest. 
The Sharps also ignored the long-standing axiom that a court 
cannot grant relief that has not been requested by the pleadings 
when they submitted an order revoking and lifting the Stay, a 
remedy they had not requested, which had not been briefed or 
argued, and which the district court was not authorized in any 
event to grant. 
The district court erred when it executed the Initial Order 
and the Amended Order notwithstanding these legal principles. In 
addition, the district court lack€Kl subject matter jurisdiction to 
execute either order. Finally, the district court committed 
reversible legal error when it entered its approval of the Sharps' 
disputed attorneys' fees without making any findings. 
All the foregoing legal errors on the part of the district 
court require this Court to reverse the orders. 
DATED: August 27, 1990. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
By fiiUM. tlk/ftD 
Robert M. Andersoil"^ 
Glen D. WatkirisL-J^ 
Bruce Wycoff^ 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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LEON h. ,-JNDERS; ROBERT 
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SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a 
Utah general partnerhip; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
rAdinci.::'••, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, ana GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
countereiaim-fiamtirrs, 
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
j defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
I counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
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GOio 
NOW., THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED .'.NI'1 DE-
CREED that plaintiffs1 Comp I a \ ' ' " rtinnij ."..el,
 M cause of 
action. . 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Saunders, Feltor nterstate Rent a 3 s , - *r* i
 n-
deb^ '-"""J1, 101 severally, to the Sharps in the following 
amounts: 
a. i. Principal: $ .5 
I « t «r 1 1 >st ' '" ' ,»if ,|h 
March 22, 1988: I"1!
 rU;l3 , 54 
iii Late payment charge: i i -i s J 
TOT A I •: i SB"", 6 4 2 46 
together with interest thereon at, the per diem rate of 
$183 32 J - : March 22f 1988. 
i. xrus ,c" $ 1,803 SO 
ii. rnm* Costs: S 2,881.04 
iii ' tc rreys ! fees through 
August 31, 1988; 144 ,088.75 
i.uyeilie: wiiii interest thereon it the :ate M: I'* i er 
annum from the date of expenditure by the sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by Jaw property t v,p^ »i-rr i . j -> O:I f and 
'..»•;» • 'j^ '-o'ipr1 ,. - s t thereon at the rate < " 12% per 
annum. 
_3_ GOl^f 
ooooo.i 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of 
the Sharps' reasonable attorneyfs fees as established by affi-
davit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any 
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution 
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Temporary Restraining Order entered in the above captioned I 
matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dis-
solved. The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the 
bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in Sep-
tember, 1986 in the amount of S2,400.00 and against the secur-
ity posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court 
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plain-
tiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject 
premises. i 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as 
described in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches 
Phase I and the unplatted orooertv more particularlv described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may 
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing 
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth here-
inabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be 
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State 
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that 
-4- 001U7J 
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? ? ; j 'Sheriff, if and i-hem the subject premises >M »» sola >. I 
•:;- - • - proceeds ;f 'IM," !i. ".M1 sh.n I I retain first, fJ(J 
cc^ 11," i" vi hemtMi J i. J I'KJ commission, and then pa1, i j - ^  
wr.- . , L-r t: t h e n attorneys, the accrued a;;d accr-.,,, v:! o r , 
of this action, then said sums r •  t IP Shaips dt:crneys 
fees, a n«1 i 11»" fi 111 < >' «•« i J I ^  I '> the Sharps for p r i n c i p a 1, i - • 
\e:<? , :j5t" expenses cf sale and maintenance, \IIPI 
assessments and/ :-. insurance premiurns , tcge r: he t ,., ,„ th a :c:ue^ 
interest the: , • i saic sums .is said proceeds 
v Lhe surplus, if any, shall be accounted f:r 
and paid over to the Clerk of this Cou: i snhn HI* t . i \ 
Court"s fur ther order. 
IT I.'i i^hVIhER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all per-
sons having an interest in the subject premises »-> * > ' '  « • 
right
 r upon producing ,?mK *\r!K ' : r , ;,; .nterest, t: ''-*" 
deem * !'e Jime wi.lu.i t Jn.» '..me provided by law for such redemp-
tion, that; from and after the expiration cf the oe»jc J f re-
demption as provided t:y law, IN1/ 'J'*. , u ^ / i i i ± above named, 
dnu i' H i' ' n -in i j all persons claiming D V , tnrougn or ur,-
der ..lem, i in* :f t nam , shall c e forever barred and fore-
closed of all riant, title, interest, and estate in and to the 
subject premises, and that fr'.r a' ' flr*^r *he delivery :f l^e 
:1
 ^ i: I £ £ "s Deed to tt le subject premises that the grantees named 
-herein be given possession -, hereof. 
. io FURTHEf OPS i- \D JUDGED A w n DECREED that If 8 
leiiciency results after due end proper application of the 
GOl^-1 
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded 
a personal judgment against Saunders, Felton, Norton and 
Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and sev-
erally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
i IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
ii Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connec-
tion to both plaintiffs' culinary, water and sewer systems on 
jl White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 
ij each. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a non-
j exclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a 
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude, 
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of 
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit HAM attached hereto 
II and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and pur-
II 
|| chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their invitees, 
•, guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and 
i( for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and 
;j egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and 
! j 
•; across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the re-
ii corded, final plat.of.White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with 
I the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant 
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the 
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in 
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches 
-6-
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wners and purchasers a 
Sharps) I f i - i! -u i us . . . nterest ;_ war*: 
!ii J water systems over, under and across the 
subject premises near the southwest corner of *:Vj H H I M - M I 
•creage D e±*v ("l' ' M " u ' i i e». J i d e d plat ,! w!" .te Pin-:.' 
r 5 - . has A "" I 
IT FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
fir* ~^ ..* ,
 r. - _ n a n t ? recorded 
. - - :*.^- * Summit Cc-r.i/ :ec::d-
-;r,-e;<cl-s; ^ easements set :c;tn aoove 
„ ,\ <2 L *;' \ T 6 f " 6 1 1 f ' S 
Sal subsequent redemptior z: e :D^ecfr -•-rises 
other than complete ^edempti t.::. 
her . ,_• declaration : 
tinguishmen. c: t;.e -exclus; -• easement _.. ~. ^ ^ e 
unplatted acreage. 
DATED - yJoXdar: of _ ^ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 1988. 
' - Tt -S. » 
s h a l l rema: 
- 7 -
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Donald J. Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
Tfhrd judicial District 
MAR 1 6 1990 
\ ^Jb*i/r LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Defendants, 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al. 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
-v-
ROBERT FELTON, et al., 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS1 
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO 
INCREASE LIABLITY ON BOND 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants1 Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and 
Motion to Increase Liability on Bond came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on Monday, 
the 12th day of February, 1990 at the hour of 10:30 a.m. The 
Sharps were represented by their counsel Donald J. Winder and 
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Kathy A, F. Davis. Plaintiffs were represented by their coun-
sel Robert M. Anderson and Mark Gaylord. The Court, having 
reviewed the pleadings and memoranda on file herein, having 
heard the arguments of counsel, having received the proffers 
of counsel for the Sharps, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Taxes on Lot 1 as described in the final recorded 
plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I in the principal amount of 
$2,271.48 plus penalties and interest thereon be paid on or 
before March 15, 1990. If the plaintiffs fail to pay the 
taxes due and owing on Lot 1 by March 15, 1990, the Order 
Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 shall be automatic-
ally vacated and defendants shall be allowed to proceed to 
execute on the Judgment and this Order entered herein. Subse-
quent to the Courtfs ruling, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Pay-
ment or Property Taxes Pursuant to the Court's Order dated 
February 22, 1990. 
2. The Judgment entered in this matter on September 26, 
1988 and the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond entered on March 17, 
1989 are hereby supplemented through August 1, 1990 in the 
following amounts: 
a. Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in-
curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October 
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes 
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plain-
tiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants' 
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Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the 
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84.00; 
"Tracy Collins Appeal" in the amount of $24,381.51 (for a 
total of $24,938.89); 
b. The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment 
from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the 
attorney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid 
through September 26, 1983 as follows: 
(1) Principal from 3/2/88 
to 9/26/88: $34,464.16 
(2) Attorney's fees: $ 5,800.77 
(3) Court costs: $ 249.63 
(4) Trustee's fees: $ 230.93 
TOTAL: $40,745.49 
c. The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on 
payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment 
from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through August 1, 
1990 as follows: 
(1) Principal ($183.32 x 
674 days): $123,557.68 
(2) Attorney's fees: 
Paid Prior to Judgment 
(Second Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom) $11,287.91 
($28.20 x 274 days) $ 7,726.80 
Paid Post-Judgment 
(Third Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom) $ 5,446.29 $ 24,461.00 
(3) Court costs ($.79 x 
674 days): $ 532.46 
(4) Trustee's fees ($.49 x 
674 days): $ 330.26 
TOTAL: $148,881.40*" 
d. The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond is supplemented in 
the amount of $136,800.99, the amount of the Judgment as of 
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August 1, 1990 ($976,009.98) less the security thereon 
($839,208.99). The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond awarding a 
supersedeas bond in the amount of $79,793.36 (which was the 
anticipated interest accruing for one year post-judgment) to-
gether with the Tracy Collins bond in the amount of 
$28,570.63, the cash bond of $2,400 and Lot 6 and the un-
platted property valued at $728,445.00 secure the Judgment in 
the amount of $839,208.99. The Judgment as of September 1, 
1990, as supplemented herein, amounts to $976,009.98 — prin-
cipal and pre- and post-judgment interest thereon in the 
amount of $715,664.30, plus costs in the amount of $228,740.93 
plus pre- and post-judgment interest on such costs in the 
amount of $31,604.75. See attached Exhibit "A," the Calcula-
tion of Supersedeas Bond. 
3. The attorney's fees requested with regard to the 
"Settlement," in the amount of $473.78, and "Tracy Collins 
Appeal," in the amount of $24,381.51, as set forth on the Sum-
mary are taken under advisement. 
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as 
a supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution of 
the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond dated 
March 17, 1989 in the amount of $136,800.99 on or before 
March 15, 1990. If Plaintiffs fail to do so by March 15, 
1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 
shall be automatically vacated and the Sharps shall be allowed 
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to proceed to execute on the Judgment entered in the above 
captioned matter. 
DATED t h i s vk day of ]tlftf^ * l 9 9 ° -
BY THE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused true and correct copies of 
the foregoing proposed ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS* SECOND MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND 
and THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF ALBERT D. NYSTRCM to be hand delivered 
on this *l ***ciay of March, 1990, to the following: 
i 
i 
} 
J Stanford B. Owen, Esq. 
Patrick L. Anderson, Esc. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Post Office Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
Glen D. Watkins, Esc. 
Mark R. Gaylcrd, Esc. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018 
and to be mailed, postage prepaid, on this /- day of March, 
1990, to the following: 
John B. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Post Office Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
hmteL^P^ ^MVUUP 
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CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Trust Deed Note 
(a) Principal $371,739.35 
(b) Interest - March 22, 1988 171,033.54 
(c) Interest - March 22, 1988 through 
September 26, 1988 ($183.32 x 188 days) 34,464.16 
(d) Late Payment Penalty 14,869.57 
SUBTOTAL: $592,106.62 
(e) Post-Judgment Interest — 
September 26, 1988 through 
August 1, 1990 ($183.32 x 674 days) 123,557.68 
SUBTOTAL: $715,664.30 
Costs 
(a) Trustees Fees $ 1,803.80 
(b) Court Costs 2,881.04 
(c) Attorney's Fees 
(i) Awarded in Judgment 144,088.75 
(ii) Third Affidavit plus fees 
requested in Motion less fees in 
amount of $24,938.89 under advisement 79,967.34 
SUBTOTAL: $228,740.9 3 
Interest 
(a) Legal Fees paid to August 1, 1990 
($24,461.00 plus pre-judgment 
interest of $5,800.77) $ 30,261.77 
(b) Trustees Fees to August 1, 1990 
($.49 x 674 days plus pre-judgment 
interest of $230.63) 560.89 
(c) Court costs to August 1, 1990 
($.79 x 674 days plus pre-judgment 
interest of $249.63) * 782.09 
SUBTOTAL: $ 31,604.75 
TOTAL: $976,009,98 
000014 
CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
( P a g e 2) 
_Security 
(a) Lot 6 and Unplatted Property $728,445.00 
(b) Temporary Restraining Order Bonds 
(i) Cash Bond 2,400.00 
(ii) Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. Bond 28,570.63 
(c) Supersedeas Bond 79,793.36 
TOTAL: (With Tracy Collins Bond) $839,208.99 
Additional Security Necessary 
(a) Judgment as of August 1, 1990 $976,009.98 
(b) LESS: Present Security 839,208.99 
ADDITIONAL SECURITY NEEDED: 
(With Tracy Collins Bond) $136,800.99 
-2- 000015 
Donald J. Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
MAY 1 h J^3 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al. 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
-v-
ROBERT FELTON, et al., 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
AMENDED 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO 
INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND 
3LV\ 3 .2 . ^ 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants1 Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and 
Motion to Increase Liability on Bond came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable J, Dennis Frederick on Monday, 
the 12th day of February, 1990 at the hour of 10:30 a.m. The 
Sharps were represented by their counsel Donald J. Winder and 
Kathy A. F. Davis. Plaintiffs were represented by their 
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counsel Robert M. Anderson and Mark Gaylord. The Court, hav-
ing reviewed the pleadings and memoranda on file herein, hav-
ing heard the arguments of counsel, having received the prof-
fers of counsel for the Sharps, and good cause appearing I 
therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
I 
1. Taxes on Lot 1 as described in the final recorded [ 
plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I in the principal amount of I 
$2,271.48 plus penalties and interest thereon be paid on or ; 
before March 15, 1990. If the plaintiffs fail to pay the 
taxes due and owing on Lot 1 by March 15, 1990, the Order 
Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 shall be automati-
cally vacated and defendants shall be allowed to proceed to 
execute on the Judgment and this Order entered herein. Subse-
quent to the Court's ruling, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Pay-
ment or Property Taxes Pursuant to the Court's Order dated 
February 22, 1990. 
2. The Judgment entered in this matter on September 26, 
1988 is hereby supplemented through February 12, 1990 by the i 
amount of $231,636.97 for a total Judgment of $938,053.02 as j 
of February 12, 1990. The supplementation includes the fol- ' 
lowing amounts: s 
I 
a. Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in- ! 
i 
curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October \ 
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes i 
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plain-
tiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants' j 
"
2
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Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the 
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84.00; 
"Tracy Collins Appeal" in the amount of $24,381.51 (for a 
total of $24,938.89); 
b. The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment 
from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the at-
torney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through 
September 26, 1988 as follows: 
(1) Principal from 3/22/88 
to 9/26/88: $34,464.16 
(2) Attorney's fees: $ 5,800.77 
(3) Court costs: $ 249.63 
(4) Trustee's fees: $ 230.93 
TOTAL: $40,745.49 
c. The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on 
payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment 
from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through February 12, 
1990 as follows: 
(1) Principal 
($183.32 x 504 days 
9/26/88 - 2/12/90): $ 92,393.28 
(2) Attorney's fees: 
Paid Prior to Judgment 
(i) (Second Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom 
9/27/88 - 10/31/89): $11,287.91 
(ii) ($28.20 x 104 days 
10/31/88 - 2/12/90): $ 2,932.80 
Paid Post-Judgment 
(9/26/88 - 2/12/90) 
(i) (Third Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom 
$5,446.29 - $1,781.26, 
(interest backed out, 
2/13/90 - 8/1/90, 
169 days x $10.54): $ 3,665.03 $ 17,885.74 
~
3
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(3) Court costs 
($.79 x 504 days 
9/26/88 - 2/12/90): $ 398.16 
(4) Trustee's fees: 
($.49 x 504 days 
9/26/88 - 2/12/90) $ 246.96 
TOTAL: $110,924.14 
3. The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond entered on March 17, 
1989 is hereby supplemented through August 1, 1990 in the fol-
lowing amounts: 
a. Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in-
curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October 
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes 
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plain- ' 
tiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants' 
Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary'1): "Settlement" in the 
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84.00; 
"Tracy Collins Appeal" in the amount of $24,381.51 (for a 
total of $24,938.89); ' 
! 
b. The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment
 ( 
i 
from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the at- • 
torney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through 
September 26, 1988 as follows: 
(1) Principal from 3/22/88 
to 9/26/88: $34,464. if, 
(2) Attorney's fees: $ 5,800.77 
(3) Court costs: $ 249.63 
(4) Trustee's fees: $ 230.93 
TOTAL: $40,745.49 
c. The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on | 
payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment ' 
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from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through August 1, 
1990 as follows: 
(1) Principal ($183.32 x 
674 days): $123,557.68 
(2) Attorney's fees: 
Paid Prior to Judgment 
(Second Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom) $11,287.91 
($28.20 x 274 days) $ 7,726.80 
Paid Post-Judgment 
(Third Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom) $ 5,446.29 $ 24,461.00 
(3) Court costs ($.79 x 
674 days): $ 532.46 
(4) Trustee's fees ($.49 x 
674 days): $ 330.26 
TOTAL: $148,881.40 
d. The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond is supplemented in 
the amount of $136,800.99, through August 1, 1990 ($976,009.98) 
less the security thereon ($839,208.99). The Order Re: Super-
sedeas Bond awarding a supersedeas bond in the amount of 
$79,793.36 (which was the anticipated interest accruing for 
one year post-judgment), together with the Tracy Collins bond 
in the amount of $28,570.63, the cash bond of $2,400 and Lot 6 
and the unplatted property valued at $728,445.00 previously 
secured the Judgment in the amount of $839,208.^9. See 
attached Exhibit "A," the Calculation of Supersedeas Bond. 
4. The attorney's fees requested with regard to the 
"Settlement," in the amount of $473.78, and "Tracy Collins 
Appeal," in the amount of $24,381.51, as set forth on the Sum-
mary are taken under advisement. 
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5. Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as 
a supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution of 
the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond dated 
March 17, 1989 in the amount of $136,800.99 on or before 
March 15, 1990. If Plaintiffs fail to do so by March 15, 
1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 
shall be automatically vacated and the Sharps shall be allowed 
to proceed to execute on the Judgment entered in the above 
captioned matter 
DATED this M*^day oi , 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused true and correct copies of 
the foregoing proposed AMENDED ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY 
ON BOND to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this O Q, 
day of April, 1990, to the following: 
Stanford B. Owen, Esq. 
Patrick L. Anderson, Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Post Office Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1018 
John B. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Post Office Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
David L. Gladwell 
Chapter 7 Trustee 
Post Office Box 3205 
Ogden, Utah 84409 
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EXHIBIT MAM 
CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Trust Deed Note 
(a) Principal $371,739.35 
(b) Interest - March 22, 1988 171,033.54 
(c) Interest - March 22, 1988 through 
September 26, 1988 ($183.32 x 188 days) 34,464.16 
(d) Late Payment Penalty 14,869.57 
SUBTOTAL: $592,106.62 
(e) Post-Judgment Interest — 
September 26, 1988 through 
August 1, 1990 ($183.32 x 674 days) 123,557.68 
SUBTOTAL: $715,664.30 
Costs 
(a) Trustees Fees $ 1,803.80 
(b) Court Costs 2,881.04 
(c) Attorney's Fees 
(i) Awarded in Judgment 144,088.75 
(ii) Third Affidavit plus fees 
requested in Motion less fees in 
amount of $24,938.89 under advisement 79,967.34 
SUBTOTAL: $228,740.93 
Interest 
(a) Legal Fees paid to August 1, 1990 
($24,461.00 plus pre-judgment 
interest of $5,800.77) $ 30,261.77 
(b) Trustees Fees to August 1, 1990 
($.49 x 674 days plus pre-judgment 
interest of $230.63) 560.89 
(c) Court costs to August 1, 1990 
($.79 x 674 days plus pre-judgment 
interest of $249.63) 782.09 
SUBTOTAL: $ 31,604.75 
TOTAL: $976.009.98 
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CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
(Page 2) 
Security 
(a) Lot 6 and Unplatted Property $728,445.00 
(b) Temporary Restraining Order Bonds 
(i) Cash Bond 2,400.00 
(ii) Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. Bond 28,570.63 
(c) Supersedeas Bond 79,793.36 
TOTAL: (With Tracy Collins Bond) $839,208.99 
Additional Security Necessary 
(a) As of August 1, 1990 $976,009.98 
(b) LESS: Present Security 839,208.99 
ADDITIONAL SECURITY NEEDED: 
(With Tracy Collins Bond) $136,800.99 
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